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Abstract: The article discusses the advantage to creditors’ requirement in voluntary surrender, 
friendly and compulsory sequestration in South Africa. This is done to, inter alia, examine the 
meaning and application of the advantage to creditors’ requirement in sequestration proceedings in 
South Africa. It is also done to comparatively discuss the burden of proof and the court’s discretion in 
relation to the advantage to creditors’ requirement in voluntary surrender, friendly and compulsory 
sequestration proceedings. To this end, the article provides an overview analysis of the meaning and 
interpretation of the advantage to creditors’ requirement, the burden of proof and the possible 
differences in the application of this requirement in the relevant sequestration proceedings. 
Accordingly, the article provides a discussion of the possible challenges and the court’s discretion in 
the adjudication and application of the advantage to creditors’ requirement in all sequestration 
proceedings in South Africa. 
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1. Introductory Remarks 
Insolvency-related matters and all sequestration proceedings are regulated by the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (“Insolvency Act”, see ss 3-25) in South Africa. No 
application for the sequestration of the debtor or insolvent’s estate will be granted 
unless if it is to the advantage of all creditors (ss 3; 6(1); 10(c) and 12(1)(c) of the 
                                                          
1 Professor, Faculty of Law, North-West University, South Africa, Address: Private Bag X2046, 
Mmabatho, 2735, South Africa, Corresponding author: howard.chitimira@nwu.ac.za. 
2 LLM Candidate, Faculty of Law, North-West University, South Africa, Address: Private Bag 
X2046, Mmabatho, 2745, South Africa, Corresponding author: terrancemabina@gmail.com. This 
article was influenced in part by Mabina’s LLB dissertation entitled LLB mini-dissertation entitled An 
Analysis of the Malpractices Associated with Friendly Sequestration in South Africa. In this regard, 
he wishes to acknowledge the expert input of Prof H Chitimira. 
AUDJ, Vol. 15, No. 2/2019, pp. 62-83 
 
The Meaning of Advantage to Creditors 
under Voluntary, Compulsory and 
Friendly Sequestration in South 
Africa 
JURIDICA 
 63 
Insolvency Act). This clearly shows that the advantage to creditors’ requirement is 
crucially applicable to all sequestration proceedings in South Africa. Put 
differently, the debtor in voluntary surrender and the sequestrating creditor or 
friendly creditor in compulsory or friendly sequestration respectively, are obliged 
to prove that the sequestration of the debtor and/or insolvent’s estate will be to the 
advantage of creditors before the sequestration is granted by the courts (ss 6(1); 
10(c); 12(1) (c) read with s 9 of the Insolvency Act). This indicates that the 
advantage to creditors’ requirement plays a pivotal role in the preliminary 
consideration and final adjudication of any application for the sequestration of the 
debtor’s estate in South Africa (Loubser, 1997, p. 325; Amod v Khan 1947 2 SA 
432 (N) 438, “Amod case”). Thus, the courts will not grant a sequestration order 
that is inspired by other ulterior motives on the part of the applicant (Cohen v 
Mallinick 1957 1 SA 615 (C) 621; R v Meer 1957 3 SA 641 (N) 619A). 
In voluntary surrender, the debtor must prove to court that the sequestration will 
actually be to the advantage of creditors (s 6(1) read with ss 3(1); 10(c) & 12(1)(c) 
of the Insolvency Act; Burdette, 2002, p. 218). On the other hand, the sequestrating 
creditor only needs to furnish proof to the court that there is a reason to believe that 
the sequestration will be to the advantage of the general body of creditors in 
compulsory sequestration (s 9(1) read with ss 8; 10(c) & 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency 
Act; see further Pepler, 2013, pp. 15; 21–26; Lynn & Main Inc v Naidoo 2006 1 SA 
59 (N) (Naidoo case)). Likewise, under friendly sequestration, the debtor usually 
commits an act of insolvency and request a family member, friend or an amicable 
creditor to apply for its compulsory sequestration. Accordingly, the applicant or 
petitioning creditor in friendly sequestration needs only to prove that there is a 
reasonable belief that the sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors (s 9(1) 
read with ss 8; 10(c) & 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act; Klemrock (Pty) Ltd v De 
Klerk 1973 3 SA 925 (W) 927 (Klemrock case); Epstein v Epstein 1987 4 SA 606 
(C) 610; Streicher v Viljoen 1999 3 All SA 257 (NC) 258; Van Rooyen v Van 
Rooyen 2000 2 All SA 485 (SE) 490; Asheela, 2012, pp. 33-37). It is evident that 
the advantage to creditors’ requirement is similarly applied in compulsory and 
friendly sequestration (Asheela, 2012, pp. 33-37; Pepler, 2013, pp. 15, 19, 21–26). 
It is further indisputable that the advantage to creditors requirement is more 
stringently applied in voluntary surrender than it is in compulsory and friendly 
sequestration (Asheela, 2012, pp. 23-37; Temperman, 2014, p. 21; Pepler, 2013, 
pp. 11-21; Boraine, & Roestoff, 2000, pp. 241-270). For instance, the debtor is 
required to establish that there is actual advantage to creditors before the 
application for voluntary surrender is accepted by the courts. On the contrary, the 
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petitioning creditor is merely required to prove that there is reason to believe that 
the sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors in both compulsory and 
friendly sequestration. Accordingly, proving advantage to creditors has continued 
to be a stumbling block to some debtors wishing to apply for voluntary surrender in 
South Africa (Roestoff & Coetzee, 2012, pp. 58-59). This follows the fact that 
many debtors do not usually have sufficient assets to, inter alia, prove that their 
application for voluntary surrender will actually yield some advantage to creditors. 
Consequently, some debtors cannot successfully apply for the voluntary surrender 
of their insolvent estates while on the other hand, it is relatively easy for creditors 
to merely prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there is “reason to believe” that 
the compulsory or friendly sequestration of the debtor’s estate will be to the 
advantage of creditors.  
As indicated above, it appears that the Insolvency Act is mainly creditor-oriented 
and relatively harsher on debtors in relation to the application and proving of the 
advantage to creditors’ requirement in all types of sequestration proceedings 
(Evans, 2001, pp. 485-508). Consequently, overburdened debtors seeking debt 
relief that cannot prove advantage to creditors are not considered for voluntary 
surrender and/or adequately protected under the Insolvency Act. This is also 
evidenced in the wording of most provisions of the Insolvency Act that covers 
different classes of creditors while there is no provision for the different classes of 
debtors, especially, those that can and those that cannot prove or satisfy the 
advantage to creditors requirement (Asheela, 2012, pp. 23-37; Evans, 2001, p. 
508). This indicates that there are various disparities and/or challenges on the 
protection of the creditors and debtors’ interests under the Insolvency Act 
(Roestoff & Coetzee, 2012, pp. 58-60). These challenges and disparities in the 
establishment and application of the advantage to creditors’ requirement are prima 
facie proof that the Insolvency Act mainly protects creditors but does not equally 
do the same in respect of the debtors’ own interests, especially, in respect of the 
stricter voluntary surrender application requirements as opposed to those of 
compulsory and friendly sequestration (Boraine & Van Heerden, 2010, pp. 87-92). 
Given this background, it appears that the advantage to creditors’ requirement 
creates undue hardship on legitimate insolvent debtors that take the initiative of 
surrendering their estates for sequestration bona fide but cannot establish or 
successfully prove the advantage or benefit that must be received by the creditors 
from such sequestration. This is a clear indication that the South African 
insolvency law is too creditor-oriented.  
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In light of the above, the article discusses the advantage to creditors’ requirement 
in voluntary surrender, friendly and compulsory sequestration in South Africa. This 
is done to, inter alia, examine the meaning and application of the advantage to 
creditors’ requirement in sequestration proceedings in South Africa. It is also done 
to comparatively discuss the burden of proof and the court’s discretion in relation 
to the advantage to creditors’ requirement in voluntary surrender, friendly and 
compulsory sequestration proceedings (Asheela, 2012, pp. 23-37; Temperman, 
2014, p. 21; Pepler, 2013, pp. 11-21; Boraine & Roestoff, 2000, pp. 241-270). To 
this end, the article provides an overview analysis of the meaning and 
interpretation of the advantage to creditors’ requirement, the burden of proof and 
the possible differences in the application of this requirement in the relevant 
sequestration proceedings. Accordingly, the article provides a discussion of the 
possible challenges and the court’s discretion in the adjudication and application of 
the advantage to creditors’ requirement in all sequestration proceedings in South 
Africa. 
 
2. Meaning of Advantage to Creditors under the Insolvency Act 
The term “advantage to creditors” is not expressly defined under the Insolvency 
Act (Roestoff & Coetzee, 2012, pp. 55-57). Additionally, other related key terms 
such as “sequestration”, “winding up”  and “concursus creditorum” are not defined 
in both the Insolvency Act and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act 
2008). It appears that the meaning and interpretation of these terms was 
discretionary left to the courts. Nonetheless, the term “sequestration order” is 
widely defined as an order of the court, including a provisional sequestration order 
that is not set aside, that enables the debtor or insolvent’s estate to be sequestrated 
(s 2 of the Insolvency Act).  
The Insolvency Act provides that the applicant must comply with the advantage to 
creditors’ requirement in voluntary, friendly and/or compulsory sequestration 
proceedings before such application is granted (ss 3(1); 6(1); 8 & 9(1) read with ss 
10(c) & 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act). Nevertheless, unlike the position under 
voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration, the Insolvency Act is silent on 
the requirements for friendly sequestration (ss 3(1); 6(1); 8 & 9(1) read with ss 
10(c) & 12(1)(c)).  
It is, however, important to note that no provisional or final order of sequestration 
is granted by the relevant courts in South Africa unless the advantage to creditors’ 
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requirement is satisfied by the applicant in respect thereof. To this end, the courts’ 
interpretation of the advantage to creditors’ requirement is considered to 
understand the meaning of the term “advantage to creditors” (Roestoff & Coetzee, 
2012, pp. 55-57). For instance, Naidoo case 18, held that the advantage to creditors 
requirement entails that there must be a reasonable prospect of some pecuniary 
benefit to the general body of creditors. The approach followed in this case is 
correct in as far as the benefit to the general body of creditors is concerned. Put 
differently, the Naidoo case correctly held that the advantage to creditors’ 
requirement may only be established if some pecuniary benefit accrue to the 
general body of creditors as opposed to an individual creditors’ own benefit. Be 
that as it may, the mere fact that a surplus is left after the sequestration expenses 
are recouped does not always suggest that the final sequestration of the debtor’s 
estate will actually give rise to the advantage of creditors (Naidoo case 18; Pepler, 
2013, pp. 21–26). It is submitted that the advantage to creditors is easily 
established where there is a positive change in the position of the creditors before 
and after the sequestration of the debtor’s estate. 
The advantage to creditors requirement entails that sequestration should yield some 
benefit to all the creditors of the insolvent debtor. This was echoed in Lotzof v 
Raubenheimer Lotzof v Raubenheimer 1959 1 SA 90 (O) 94 (Lotzof case), which 
held that the term “advantage of creditors” meant an advantage of all or at least the 
general body of creditors (Smith, 1985, pp. 27-32). This approach appears to be 
similar to the one employed in the Naidoo case. In this regard, the term “advantage 
to creditors” refers to the benefit given to the general body of creditors as opposed 
to an individual benefit for a particular creditor. Accordingly, it is usually 
presumed that creditors know what is in their commercial and/or economic benefit 
during sequestration proceedings (Ex parte Gardener 1927 CPD 452). This means 
that the creditors are usually in the better position than any other party to determine 
what is to their advantage. The general rule is that no creditor should be enriched at 
the expense of other creditors during any sequestration proceedings. The 
Insolvency Act expressly provides that no creditor should obtain any undue 
advantage over other creditors during and after the final sequestration of the 
insolvent debtor’s estate (ss 26; 27 & 29-31 of the Insolvency Act; Smith, 1985, 
pp. 27-32). In this regard, the term “advantage to creditors” refers to the orderly 
and equitable sharing and distribution of all the insolvent debtor’s assets to all the 
creditors on a just basis (Smith, 1985, pp. 27-32).  
JURIDICA 
 67 
As indicated earlier, the courts usually compare the position of the creditors, before 
and after the sequestration of the debtor’s estate, in order to establish if the 
sequestration in question will be to the advantage of all creditors (Sharrock, Van 
Der Linde & Smith, 2012, p. 39; South African Law Commission, 1989, p. 112). In 
London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 1957 3 SA 591 (D) 593 (London Estate case), the 
court held that the sequestration of the debtor’s estate will be to the advantage of 
creditors only when it results in some payment or not negligible dividend to accrue 
to all creditors in respect of their proved liquidated claims as stipulated in section 
9(1) and (2) of the Insolvency Act. However, the authors submit that the 
sequestration of the debtor’s estate could still be to the advantage of creditors if it 
appears that the payment which will accrue to all the creditors is less than the 
actual debt owed therein. The rationale for this assertion is that despite failing to 
fully recover their debts, all the creditors would have at least received something 
out of the debtor’s estate after its final sequestration. Additionally, the authors 
submit that the period for which the debt subsisted should also be considered by the 
courts when determining whether the final sequestration order will be to the 
advantage of creditors. 
In ABSA Bank Ltd v De Klerk 1999 4 SA 835 (E) 870 (De Klerk case), the court 
provided that prospective dividends of five and/or six cents in the rand were not 
negligible and/or not too small to establish the advantage to creditors requirement 
in the sequestration of the debtor’s estate. However, in Nieuwenhuizen v Nedcor 
Bank Ltd [2001] 2 All SA 364 (O) 367, the court held that a not negligible dividend 
must amount to a minimum of ten cents in the rand. The authors concur with the 
latter view and argue further that the relevant dividend should differ in respect of 
different debts owed by the debtor to creditors and in accordance with ranking of 
such creditors.   
Fesi v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 1 SA 499 (C) 505–506 (Fesi case), held that the 
advantage to creditors requirement should be tested in respect of the body of 
creditors as a whole not the individual applicant or minority of creditors. It is, 
however, not necessary to merely prove that the debtor has some assets during 
sequestration proceedings (Visser, Pretorius, Sharrock & Van Jaarsveld, 2004, p. 
547). Failure to satisfy the advantage to creditors’ requirement results in the refusal 
of the application for sequestration by the courts in South Africa (Govindjee, et al, 
2007, p. 80). In other words, although there are other statutory requirements that 
must be complied with by the applicant under voluntary surrender, compulsory 
sequestration and friendly sequestration (see discussions in sub-headings below), 
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no sequestration order is granted by the courts until the advantage to creditors’ 
requirement satisfactorily met by the applicant (ss 3(1); 6(1); 8 & 9(1) read with ss 
10(c) & 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act). The court must be satisfied whether 
creditors will receive some pecuniary benefit when establishing the advantage to 
creditors’ requirement (Naidoo case 59-68). However, it remains difficult to 
ascertain whether all types of creditors will receive their dividends pari passu 
(Cisse, Madhava Menon, Cordonier Segger & Nmehielle, 2014, pp. 94-96). In light 
of this, the pari passu principle could suggest that if the debtor’s estate has 
insufficient assets to meet all the creditor’s claims, the creditors’ claims or 
dividends must abate rateably among themselves. This could also imply that the 
debtor’s assets are distributed to its unsecured creditors in proportion to the size of 
their respective claims and each of the creditors must bear a proportionate share of 
the shortfall (Ferran & Ho, 2014, p. 301). The courts may consider other factors in 
respect of the advantage to creditors’ requirement such as whether the trustee will 
be able to unearth other assets and whether there are alternative repayment 
measures. Thus, if there is a possibility that the trustee might discover other assets 
in respect of the debtor’s estate through an enquiry, there could be advantage to 
creditors. Moreover, the courts may also consider factors such as an administration 
order under the Magistrate Courts Act 32 of 1944 (see generally s 74) and debt 
review under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (s 3; also see Smith, 1985, pp. 27-
32; Boraine & Van Heerden, 2010, pp. 87-92). Accordingly, the courts will 
determine whether the insolvent estate should be placed under an administration 
order or whether the insolvent debtor should be placed under debt review.  
In CSARS v Hawker Aviation Partnership 2006 4 SA 292 (SCA) 29 (Hawker 
Aviation Partnership case), Cameron JA submitted that the Commissioner was 
obliged to establish whether the sequestration would provide some benefit to 
creditors given the fact that the partnership was no longer functional. Additionally, 
the court held that the Commissioner only needed to indicate whether there was 
reason to believe, not a mere likelihood but a prospect that was not too remote that 
the sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors (Hawker Aviation 
Partnership case para 29). Cameron JA correctly submitted that the sequestration 
was likely to be to the advantage of creditors if it was established that the transfer 
to the new partnership involved a voidable disposition or disposition for no value 
(Hawker Aviation Partnership case para 30).  
Gardee v Dhanmanta Holdings 1978 1 SA 1066 (N) 1070, held that the advantage 
to creditors requirement is a relative and not an absolute one. The authors concur 
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with this view and submit further that the sequestration will not be to the advantage 
of creditors unless it suits them better than any other alternative measures such an 
administration order and/or debt review. As stated above, if there are reasons to 
believe that the debtor’s additional money or property could be recovered through 
an enquiry under the Insolvency Act, the advantage to creditors’ requirement will 
be satisfied. Accordingly, the applicant should place such facts before the court to 
show that there is a reasonable prospect of a pecuniary benefit to be realised by 
creditors after such enquiry (Visser, Pretorius, Sharrock & Van Jaarsveld, 2004, p. 
547; BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Furstenburg 1966 1 SA 717 (O); LTR 
Beleggings (Edms) BPK v Hechter 1977 1 SA 22 (NC)). If the debtor has no assets 
and the application is justified by reason of salary, the burden rests upon the 
applicant to prove that there is a reasonable likelihood of some monies and/or 
benefit to become available to the creditors (Visser, Pretorius, Sharrock & Van 
Jaarsveld, 2004, p. 547).  
In Stratford v Investec Bank Limited 2014 ZACC 38 and Stratford v Investec Bank 
Ltd 2015 3 SA 1 (CC) 44–45) (Stratford case), the Constitutional court held that in 
light of the appellant’s recognisable assets and other potential impeachable 
transactions laid as evidence by the respondent, there was reason to believe that the 
sequestration of the appellant or debtor’s estate will be to the advantage of 
creditors. The Constitutional court affirmed that where there is evidence that the 
debtor recently possessed cash or assets after an enquiry, the requirement of 
advantage to creditors will be satisfied. (Stratford case 11-12 & 44-46). In this 
regard and for the purposes of the advantage to creditors’ requirement, it should be 
noted that: (a) creditors in this regard means the body of creditors viewed as a 
whole or a single entity (Sharrock, 2007, pp. 700-740, 791); (b) the court is likely 
to be satisfied if there is a reasonable prospect or reason to believe that the 
sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors.  
In Botha v Botha 1990 4 SA 580 (W) 2, Leverson J held, inter alia, that the debtor 
must prove that the sequestration of his or her estate will be to the advantage all the 
creditors, especially, in voluntary surrender. Furthermore, a proper valuation of the 
applicant’s immovable property should be conducted in order to determine whether 
the sequestration in question have the prospects of a pecuniary benefit for all the 
creditors. This applies in respect of a voluntary surrender while the sequestrating 
creditor is presumed to know what constitutes advantage to creditors in compulsory 
and friendly sequestration as discussed below.  
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2.1. The Advantage to Creditors Requirement in Voluntary Surrender 
Voluntary surrender occurs when a debtor or its agent knowingly and intentionally 
applies to the court for the sequestration of its estate (ss 3(1) & 6(1) read with ss 4; 
7; 8; 9(1) & (2); 10(c) & 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act; Haupt, et al, 2009, pp. 
122-127). It must be noted that a natural person (a debtor himself or herself or his 
or her duly authorised agent (Ex parte Brown 1951 4 SA 246 (N)); an executor of a 
deceased debtor’s estate and a curator bonis of a prodigal’s estate may apply for 
voluntary surrender (s 3(1) of the Insolvency Act; see further Ex parte Houston 
1958 1 SA 448 (N)). Furthermore, members of a partnership’s estate (s 3(2) of the 
Insolvency Act; also see Ex parte Bester 1937 CPD 45) and both spouses of a joint 
estate of spouses married in community of property may also apply for voluntary 
surrender.  
An applicant for voluntary surrender must comply with three requirements under 
the Insolvency Act (s 6(1)). Firstly, the applicant must prove that the debtor’s 
estate is actually insolvent (s 6(1) of the Insolvency Act; Van der Merwe & du 
Plessis, 2004, pp. 353-357). This could indicate that the applicant must prove on a 
balance of probabilities that the debtor’s estate is factually insolvent. Factual 
insolvency occurs when the liabilities of a natural or juristic person as fairly 
assessed, exceed the value of its assets leading to its inability to pay all the debts 
and/or subordinated debts of the relevant creditors as they fall due (Luiz & Van der 
Linde, 1993, p. 231). Accordingly, it seems that proving that the debtor is 
commercially insolvent does not suffice for the purposes of voluntary surrender 
which requires actual or factual insolvency on the part of the applicant. 
Commercial insolvency occurs when an individual, entity or company fails to pay 
its debts when they fall due despite the fact that its assets might still be exceeding 
its liabilities. Secondly, the applicant must prove that the debtor owns property of 
sufficient value to cover the costs of the sequestration process, payable from the 
free residue of the insolvent estate (s 6(1) of the Insolvency Act). Notably, free 
residue is a portion of the insolvent estate which is not subject to a special 
mortgage, legal hypothec, pledge or right of retention, that remains in the estate 
after all the administration costs, sequestration costs and creditors’ claims have 
been paid in full (s 2 read with s 97 of the Insolvency Act; Ex parte Van Heerden 
1923 CPD 279). It is submitted that any assets bought by the debtor on instalments 
fall under free residue to the extent that their actual market value exceeds the 
outstanding balances or money owed to creditors (Mindel v Shaer 1937 TPD 378). 
Lastly, the applicant must prove that the sequestration of the debtor’s estate will be 
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to the advantage of creditors (s 6(1) of the Insolvency Act; Van der Merwe & du 
Plessis, 2004, pp. 353-357). As indicated earlier (see paragraph 1 above), the 
applicant or the debtor must prove on a balance of probabilities that the 
sequestration will bring actual advantage to all the affected creditors (s 6(1) read 
with ss 3(1); 10(c) & 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act; Boraine & Van Heerden, 
2010, pp. 87). This implies that proof of the actual advantage to be realised by 
creditors after the sequestration of the insolvent estate suffices for voluntary 
surrender (Temperman, 2014, p. 21). 
The applicant or debtor is further obliged to comply with certain formalities 
stipulated in the Insolvency Act. For instance, the debtor must publish his or her 
notice of intention to surrender in a Government Gazette and newspaper which 
circulates where he or she resides or at his or her place of business (s 4 of the 
Insolvency Act). The publication of the notice of surrender must be done not more 
than 30 days but not less than 14 days before the date of the hearing and/or the date 
stipulated in that notice as the date upon which the application will be made to the 
court for the acceptance of the surrender of the debtor’s insolvent estate (s 4(1) of 
the Insolvency Act). The notice of surrender must provide full names, address, 
occupation of debtor, date of acceptance of the application and the court which 
accepted it. The notice of surrender must also indicate where the debtor’s statement 
of affairs will be inspected. This is done to ensure that all affected creditors and 
other interested parties will have a chance to access and scrutinise the cause and 
correctness of the debtor’s financial position prior to the sequestration (R v Lewin 
1930 AD 344 par 349; Ex parte Goldman 1930 WLD 158). 
The applicant or debtor must also furnish the notice of surrender to creditors and 
other interested parties within seven days of the publication date of that notice. 
This could be done via an affidavit of the debtor’s attorney (Ex parte Harmse 2005 
1 SA 323 (N) 331). Accordingly, the debtor may furnish a copy of notice of 
surrender to each creditor (s 4(2) (a) of Insolvency Act; Ex parte Wassenaar 1968 
(2) SA 726 (T) 727). Where a debtor is a juristic person, it may furnish the copy of 
the notice of surrender to trade unions and employees, especially those that 
represent the affected employees (s 4(2) (b)(i) & (ii) (aa) & (bb) of the Insolvency 
Act). Such notice must be posted on a notice board, gate or place where the 
affected employees have access to see it. The debtor must also furnish a copy of the 
notice of surrender to the South African Revenue Service (SARS) (s 4(2) (b)(iii) of 
the Insolvency Act). 
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Moreover, the applicant or debtor must prepare and lodge a statement of his or her 
affairs in accordance with form B. The statement of his or her affairs must provide 
a balance sheet, a list of immovable assets and their estimated value. This 
statement must also provide a list of movable property assets and their estimated 
value (Ex parte Nel 1954 2 SA 638 (O)) as well as a list of debtors and their postal 
and residential addresses (Ex parte Silverstone 1968 2 SA 196 (O) 198). The 
statement of affairs should also include a list of sundry debts (Ex parte Murphy 
1929 EDL 168 at 171), list of creditors and their postal and residential addresses 
(Cumes & Co v Sacher 1932 WLD 213) and a list of movable assets pledged, 
hypothecated and/or subject to a lien.  
In Ex parte Pillay 1955 2 SA 309 (N) 311 (Pillay case), the court held that the 
requirements and formalities of voluntary surrender were primarily aimed at 
benefiting all affected creditors (Visser, Pretorius, Sharrock & Van Jaarsveld, 
2004, p. 543). This follows the fact that even if the debtor has proved other 
requirements as indicated above on a balance of probabilities, the court will not 
grant an application for voluntary surrender if the advantage to creditors’ 
requirement is not proved.  Consequently, if the voluntary surrender is likely to 
provide little or no benefit to the creditors, the courts have the discretion and 
powers to reject it (Ex parte Bergh 1938 CPD 132). The court will not grant the 
application for voluntary surrender if the applicant or debtor only furnishes it with 
mere allegations that are not supported by actual evidence or real facts that the 
sequestration of the debtor’s estate will be to the advantage of all creditors (Ex 
parte Smith 1958 3 SA 568 (O) 371). This clearly shows that voluntary surrender 
requires unmistakable proof on the part of the debtor or applicant that the 
sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors (Rampersad, 2013, pp. 7-19). In 
this regard, a sworn valuation of the debtor’s assets is often required to determine 
whether the final sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors (Visser, 
Pretorius, Sharrock & Van Jaarsveld, 2004, p. 553; Ex parte Mattysen et Uxor 
2003 2 SA 308 (T)). Although proof of assets is not necessary where it can be 
easily proved that a debtor has adequate assets from the free residue that are likely 
to cover his or her debts, the valuation process of the debtor’s assets enables the 
courts to determine the value of the debtor’s assets that belong to his or her 
insolvent estate. In light of this, it is clear that the advantage to creditors’ 
requirement will be satisfied in voluntary surrender by the applicant or debtor 
where the sequestration of the debtor’s estate actually yields some dividend to the 
general body of creditors (concursus creditorum). 
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2.2. The Advantage to Creditors Requirement in Compulsory Sequestration 
Compulsory sequestration occurs when one or more aggrieved creditors of a debtor 
applies to court for the sequestration of that debtor’s estate (Sharrock, Van Der 
Linde & Smith, 2012, p. 33). This normally occurs when a debtor commits an act 
of insolvency as stipulated in section 8 of the Insolvency Act. The courts may grant 
a provisional and/or final order for compulsory sequestration if the creditor 
complies with all the relevant requirements as stipulated in the Insolvency Act (ss 
9; 10(c) & 12(1) (c); see further Pepler, 2013, pp. 15-20; Mabe & Evans, 2014, pp. 
651-667). The sequestrating creditor or his or her agent must comply with three 
main requirements and related formalities (ss 9; 10(c) & 12(1) (c)). For instance, 
the creditor must prove that he or she has established a liquidated claim which 
entitles him or her to apply for the compulsory sequestration of the debtor’s 
insolvent estate (s 9(1) of the Insolvency Act). Thus, the creditor or his or her agent 
must prove that he or she has a liquidated claim against the debtor’s insolvent 
estate for not less than R100. Furthermore, if there are two or more creditors or 
their agents, they must prove that they have liquidated claims against the debtor’s 
insolvent estate for not less than R200 (s 9(1) of the Insolvency Act).  
The sequestrating or petitioning creditor and/or his or her agents must prove that 
the debtor committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent (s 9(1) read with s 8 of 
the Insolvency Act). Although the Insolvency Act is silent on the type of 
insolvency that must be proved, it appears that the petitioning creditor must prove 
that the debtor is factually insolvent. In this regard, it appears that proof that the 
debtor is commercially insolvent might not suffice for the purposes of compulsory 
sequestration. 
Moreover, the court may grant a compulsory sequestration order against the 
debtor’s estate if the creditor proves that there is a reason to believe that it will be 
to the advantage of all creditors (s 9 read with ss 10(c) & 12(1) (c) of the 
Insolvency Act; see further Temperman, 2014, pp. 23-26). Put differently, the 
creditor must prove that there is reason to believe that the sequestration of the 
debtor’s insolvent estate will be to the advantage of the whole body of creditors as 
opposed to individual creditor benefits. 
In addition, the creditor must comply with the relevant preliminary formalities such 
as proof of sufficient security for costs for his or her liquidated claim to the Master 
(s 6(1) & 9(1) of the Insolvency Act; also see R v Hohls 1959 2 SA 656 (N)). A 
liquidated claim includes a monetary claim for the goods sold and delivered by the 
seller to the purchaser. On the other hand, an unliquidated claim includes a claim 
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for damages against one’s failure to undertake their contractual obligations as 
previously agreed. Accordingly, a claim for the transfer of property does not 
suffice but a claim that accrued to a creditor although it was not yet due when the 
compulsory sequestration application in question was made is normally regarded as 
already liquidated (s 9(2) of the Insolvency Act). Nonetheless, this excludes 
contractual claims (s 9(2) of the Insolvency Act, see further Sanddune CC v Catt 
1998 2 SA 461 (SE); Paizes v Phitides 1940 WLD 189). The creditor must get a 
certificate from the Master to prove that he or she has sufficient security for costs 
(s 9(3) (b) of the Insolvency Act). Failure to provide sufficient proof of security for 
costs until the trustee is appointed could result in the rejection of the creditor’s 
compulsory sequestration application (s 9(3)(b) read with s 14(1) of the Insolvency 
Act). 
The creditor’s application for compulsory sequestration must comply with the 
prescribed form and content that must be filed in a notice of motion and a 
supporting affidavit of a creditor or any other affected person. The affidavit must 
contain full names, status, occupation and addresses of debtors and sequestrating 
creditors or their agents that are eligible to apply or support that application for 
compulsory sequestration (s 9(3) of the Insolvency Act; Thorne NO v Sinclair 1930 
EDL 409). The creditor must also comply with formalities such as search of 
Master’s records (In re Hugo 1921 CPD 742), submitting relevant information for 
the Master’s report (s 9(4) & (5) of the Insolvency Act), furnishing the debtor and 
interested parties with copies of the application, provisional sequestration, service 
of rule nisi, opposition to application, anticipation of return day, intervention by 
another creditor and final sequestration. 
As indicated earlier, the petitioning creditor need not prove actual advantage that 
accrues to the body of creditors. Nevertheless, the petitioning creditor merely needs 
to prove that there is a prima facie reason to believe that the sequestration will be 
to the advantage of all creditors (Temperman, 2014, pp. 23-26). In other words, the 
petitioning creditor must adequately prove to the courts, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the final order for compulsory sequestration will be 
advantageous to all the affected creditors for such order to be granted by the courts 
(ss 10(c) & 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act). The courts must be satisfied that the 
majority of the creditors will benefit from the compulsory sequestration of the 
debtor’s estate before they grant a provisional and/or final sequestration order (Fesi 
case para 505).  
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The advantage to creditors’ requirement is satisfied where both the provisional and 
final sequestration orders for compulsory sequestration of the debtor’s estate are 
likely to yield some dividends to all the types of affected creditors (ss 10(c) & 
12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act). Amod case para 438, held that the sequestrating 
creditor usually has little knowledge of the debtor’s estate, hence it is difficult for 
that creditor to provide satisfactory proof that the sequestration will bring some 
advantage to the body of creditors. This case shows that the advantage to creditors’ 
requirement is too onerously enforced in compulsory sequestration than in 
voluntary surrender. 
In Meskin & Co v Friedman 1948 2 SA 555 (W) 558-559 (Friedman case), Roper J 
submitted, inter alia, that the term “reason to believe” entails that the creditor need 
to positively submit to the court that the sequestration will be to the advantage of 
creditors. The courts only grant the compulsory sequestration order if there is an 
objective reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of all creditors. A 
reasonable prospect which is not too remote, proving that some pecuniary benefit 
will be obtained by affected creditors suffices for the purposes of the advantage to 
creditors’ requirement in compulsory sequestration (Friedman case 558-559). 
Notably, the belief on the part of the petitioning creditor that the sequestration will 
be to the advantage of creditors ought to be rational and reasonable enough for it to 
be accepted by the courts. Accordingly, all relevant information and facts must be 
furnished to the courts by the petitioning creditor to support such belief (Dunlop 
Tyres (Pty) Ltd v Brewitt 1999 2 SA 580 (W) 585). The advantage to creditors’ 
requirement is established if such facts are satisfactorily proved by the creditor to 
indicate a reasonable prospect that all creditors will receive some benefit after 
compulsory sequestration proceedings. Additionally, in compulsory sequestration, 
the advantage to creditors’ requirement satisfied if a substantial proportion or the 
majority of the creditors are likely to receive some dividends from the final 
sequestration proceedings (Sharrock, Van Der Linde & Smith, 2012, pp. 15; 39; 
237–274). This implies that the advantage to creditors’ requirement is not satisfied 
if only a few or no creditors will receive their dividends after the final compulsory 
sequestration order is granted (London Estate case para 593; Braithwaite v Gilbert 
1984 4 SA 717 (W) 717) & Lotzof case paras 93-94).  
2.3. The Advantage to Creditors Requirement in Friendly Sequestration 
As stated above (see paragraph 1), friendly sequestration occurs when a debtor 
agrees with a family member, friend or an amicable creditor that has a liquidated 
claim against his or her estate to apply for its compulsory sequestration. This 
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normally occurs when the insolvent debtor deliberately commits an act of 
insolvency and request a creditor to apply for compulsory sequestration on the 
basis thereof. The debtor relies mostly on section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act to 
enable an amicable creditor to apply for compulsory sequestration in order to get 
debt relief (Sharrock, Van Der Linde & Smith, 2012, pp. 45-47; Asheela, 2012, pp. 
33-37; Pepler, 2013, pp. 19–20). Affected debtors usually resort to friendly 
sequestration in a bid to evade the onerous requirements for voluntary surrender 
which, inter alia, require the debtor to provide actual proof that the sequestration 
will bring actual advantage to all creditors.  
Notably, like the position under compulsory sequestration, the petitioning creditor 
needs only to prove that there is a reasonable belief that the sequestration will be to 
the advantage of creditors in friendly sequestration (s 9(1) read with ss 8(g); 10(c) 
& 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act; Smith v Porrit 2008 6 SA 303 (SCA) 308). 
There will be no advantage to creditors where nothing or insufficient dividends are 
realised by all the affected creditors (Ex parte Ogunlaja [2011] JOL 2709 (GNP) 
para 9 “Ogunlaja case”). Vermeulen v Hubner Case number 1165/1990 (T), held 
that a friendly sequestration remains a compulsory sequestration which should, 
however, be treated as a form of voluntary surrender. The authors do not agree that 
a friendly sequestration application should be subjected to the onerous 
requirements of voluntary surrender since it commonly takes the form of a 
compulsory sequestration. In this regard, the authors concur with the argument in 
Sellwell Shop Interiors CC v Van der Merwe Case number 27527/1990 (W), that 
the creditor’s intention to co-operate with the debtor does not in itself constitute an 
abuse of the legal process through a friendly sequestration of the debtor’s estate. 
Such co-operation between the debtor and the petitioning creditor should not affect 
the granting of a compulsory sequestration order when all the requirements are 
satisfied (Jhatam v Jhatam 1958 4 SA 36 (N) 39-40; Beinash & Co v Nathan 1998 
3 SA 540 (W) 541; Yenson & Co v Garlick 1926 WLD 53 para 57). Moreover, 
Klemrock case para 927, rightly held that there was no specific requirement that 
obliges a petitioning creditor in friendly sequestration to comply will all the 
requirements of section 4 of the Insolvency Act). 
The mere fact that a compulsory sequestration application was made by a creditor 
who is willing to co-operate with the debtor does not automatically give rise to a 
friendly sequestration (Esterhuizen v Swanepoel & Sixteen other cases 2004 4 SA 
89 (W) 91). Consequently, the courts must be careful of malpractice and collusion 
between the amicable creditor and the debtor (Kuhn v Karp 1948 4 SA 825 (T) 
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827). The courts must, inter alia, verify: (a) the locus standi of creditor; (b) 
whether the creditor has provided sufficient security for costs; (c) all documentary 
evidence provided by the creditor; and (d) details of the debtor’s realisable assets 
(Nel v Lubbe 1999 3 SA 109 (W) 111), to detect collusion and other malpractices 
in friendly sequestration. As in compulsory sequestration, the petitioning creditor 
need only to prove to the courts that there is an objective reason and prospect to 
believe that the sequestration of the debtor’s estate could yield some dividends or 
pecuniary benefits to all affected creditors in friendly sequestration. This advantage 
to creditors’ requirement remains relatively less onerous to comply with than in 
voluntary surrender (Evans & Haskins, 1990, pp. 246-251). 
 
3. The Required Burden of Proof and the Court’s Discretion 
The burden of proof for the advantage to creditors’ requirement is applied 
differently in voluntary surrender as well as in friendly and compulsory 
sequestration. In voluntary surrender, the debtor bears the onus to prove to the 
court on a balance of probabilities that the sequestration will be to the advantage of 
all creditors (s 6(1) read with ss 3(1); 10(c) & 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act; 
Nagel, 2000, p. 481). The debtor is generally expected to know his or her own 
financial position well such that he or she can easily prove whether the voluntary 
surrender will actually bring some advantage to all the creditors (Ogunlaja case 
para 9; Trust Wholesalers and Woolens (Pty) Ltd v Mackan 1954 2 SA 109 (N)). 
Additionally, the debtor must prove to the court on a balance of probabilities that 
his or her insolvent estate has sufficient assets to cover the costs of sequestration. 
The courts will only grant a sequestration order for voluntary surrender if the 
debtor has proved satisfactorily on a balance of probabilities that: (a) he or she is 
actually insolvent; (b) the sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors; and 
(c) his or her insolvent estate has sufficient assets to cover the costs of 
sequestration (s 6(1) read with ss 3(1); 10(c) & 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act).  
In compulsory sequestration, the sequestrating creditor bears the onus to prove on a 
balance of probabilities to the court that there is a reason to believe that the 
sequestration will be to the advantage of the general body of creditors (ss 9; 10(c) 
& 12(1) (c) of the Insolvency Act). Thus, unlike the position under voluntary 
surrender, the sequestrating creditor needs only to prove that there is reason to 
believe that the compulsory sequestration will be to the advantage of all the 
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affected creditors (Sharrock, Van Der Linde & Smith, 2012, p. 33; Hillhouse v 
Stott 1990 4 SA 580 (W) 2). 
Likewise, in friendly sequestration, the amicable sequestrating creditor bears the 
onus to prove on a balance of probabilities that there is a prima facie reason to 
believe that the sequestration will be to the advantage of all creditors. The 
sequestrating creditor must prove that the debtor committed an act of insolvency 
and was insolvent (Evans & Haskins, 1990, pp. 249-251; Pepler, 2013, p. 19). 
Notably, the amicable creditor need not prove actual advantage but must merely 
prove to the court on a balance of probabilities that there is a reason to believe that 
the friendly sequestration will be to the advantage of all creditors. This burden of 
proof is similar to that of compulsory sequestration. 
The courts have discretionary power to grant or reject an application for voluntary 
surrender, compulsory sequestration and friendly sequestration even if all the 
requirements and formalities as discussed above are satisfactorily met on a balance 
of probabilities by the applicant (Berrange NO v Hassan 2009 2 SA 339 (N) 368; 
Evans & Haskins, 1990, p. 248). This is discretionary done by the courts when it is 
deemed just and equitable in light of the interests of all the affected parties, 
especially, creditors. Any person aggrieved by the final compulsory sequestration 
order or by an order setting aside a provisional sequestration order may obtain the 
leave to appeal from the relevant court (ss 150(1) & 20(4) of the Supreme Court 
Act 59 of 1959; Louw v WP (Kooperatief) Bpk 1998 2 SA 418 (SCA)). 
Nonetheless, no appeal is allowed against a decision to grant or not to grant a 
provisional sequestration order (Gottschalk v Gough 1997 4 562 (C) 568). The 
courts have discretion to grant or not grant the leave to appeal. In light of this, it 
must be noted that each case should be discretionary adjudicated by the courts on 
the basis of its own circumstances and merits. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
As highlighted in this article, it is evident that the advantage to creditors’ 
requirement plays an important role in the interpretation and adjudication of all 
sequestration proceedings in South Africa. The article has usefully discussed the 
advantage to creditors’ requirement, the required burden of proof and the court’s 
discretion in such sequestration proceedings in South Africa. The article also 
exposed the differences in the application of the advantage to creditors’ 
requirement in all South African sequestration proceedings. In this regard, it was 
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noted that the advantage to creditors’ requirements are more onerously applied in 
voluntary surrender than in compulsory and friendly sequestration. This status quo 
has at times, culminated into various challenges for bona fide debtors that struggle 
to prove the advantage to creditors’ requirement in order to surrender their 
insolvent estates in terms of the Insolvency Act (s 6(1) read with ss10(c) & 12(1) 
(c)). Moreover, in compulsory and friendly sequestration, the sequestrating creditor 
also struggle to prove that there is an objective reason to believe that the 
sequestration will be to the advantage of the general body of creditors. For 
instance, it is very difficult for creditors to satisfy this requirement in compulsory 
and friendly sequestration since they might not know the actual financial position 
of debtors than the debtors themselves prior to sequestration proceedings. These 
problems have been exacerbated by the fact that various Insolvency Bills such as 
the Draft Insolvency Bill of 2000 (clause 8(1) (c)) and Draft Insolvency Bill of 
2015 have to date all retained the advantage to creditors’ requirement without 
addressing the aforesaid challenges and other related problems. In light of this, it is 
submitted that the Insolvency Act should be carefully amended to completely 
remove or relax the advantage to creditors’ requirement in all types of 
sequestration proceedings in South Africa. This could enhance the adjudication of 
sequestration proceedings and encourage debtors, creditors and all affected persons 
to utilise such proceedings to recover their owed monies, settle their debts and 
easily get debt relief. 
The Insolvency Act should be also amended to move away from its creditor-
oriented approach and ensure that both creditors and debtors’ interests are 
adequately, equally and fairly protected during and after sequestration proceedings. 
In this regard, it is recommended that the advantage to creditors’ burden of proof 
and requirements in voluntary surrender should be equated to those in compulsory 
and friendly sequestration. In other words, the debtors in voluntary surrender 
should also be required to merely prove on a balance of probabilities that there is a 
reason to believe that the sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors. This 
could help overburdened debtors to lawfully utilise sequestration proceedings 
under the Insolvency Act to get debt relief (Evans, 2001, pp. 485-508). 
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